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“Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of 
Insider Trading  
 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
 
 Fifty years after Cady Roberts’ claim that the law of insider trading 
should never be circumscribed “by fine distinctions and rigid 
classifications,”1 that body of law is still mutating.  To be sure, we now 
have a stable framework of three distinct legal theories—the classical 
theory, the misappropriation theory, and Rule 14e-3—each of which is well 
understood as to its basic elements.2  Most insider trading cases handed 
down in any given year say nothing particularly new about the state of the 
law, but rather simply apply familiar principles to sometimes challenging 
facts.3  But every so often we do discover something new, and in the 
process, about the core conception(s) of insider trading. 
 Though I want to concentrate mainly on this contemporary case law 
in this essay, doctrinal history is an essential starting point.4  By all 
accounts, Chairman Cary wanted a wide scope to Rule 10b-5 that took in 
fiduciary breach (constructive fraud) as well as classical common law deceit 
to help build a federal body of corporate law that would supplement, if not 
                                                          
*  Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  My 
thanks to Donna Nagy, Sy Lorne, David Becker and Bob Thompson for helpful comments. 
1   In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) 
2  See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION chs. 3, 6, 7 (2012 ed.). 
3  Materiality questions tend to be the hardest, but the courts—both in insider trading cases 
and fraud cases generally under Rule 10b-5—have by and large resisted any efforts to take 
cases away from the fact-finder, who is expected to apply a highly general standard of what 
a reasonable investor would likely consider important.  Id. ch. 5.  For a criticism of this 
approach, see Joan Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in 
Insider Trading, 72 La. L. Rev. 999 (2012). 
4  See Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic 
Information, 73 Geo. L.J. 1083 (1985). 
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supplant, the meager efforts of state courts and legislatures.5  He thought it 
unnecessary to answer the hard questions posed by common law courts that 
had struggled with how open-market purchases or sales become deceptive 
simply because the trader had an informational advantage resulting from 
some privileged position of access,6 because federal corporation law should 
be more ambitious than that.  Cary’s expansive impulse, however, thrived 
only for a while, and within twenty years its premise—that there is a free-
floating federal fiduciary obligation discoverable within Rule 10b-5—was 
soundly rejected as a matter of principle.  In celebration of the perceived 
virtues of state-law primacy that Cary instead found so disturbing, the 
Supreme Court said that fraud under Rule 10b-5 means real deception, 
nothing less.7 
 That left insider trading law in an awkward place, because no one 
has ever been able to articulate a robust theory of harmful marketplace 
deception arising from insider trading. The insider’s order is anonymous, 
communicating nothing except the fact of a trade, inducing no one else to 
take the other side except as an independent choice to offer liquidity.  So 
where is the detrimental reliance?  On whom, or what?  There may be very 
                                                          
5  40 S.E.C. at 910.  Cary later offered useful commentary on this own thinking.  See 
William Cary et al., Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009 (1965).  While this is 
generally viewed as the driving force behind the duty to abstain or disclose, the more 
specific history of concern at the SEC about brokerage firms using inside information to 
compete for customer favor and order flow at a time of fixed commissions is also worth 
noting.  See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Chinese Walls and Brokerage 
Commissions: The Origins of Modern Regulation of Information Flows in Securities 
Markets, 4 J. L. Econ. & Pol’y 311 (2008).  Dolgopolov points to evidence that the SEC 
staff in the New York regional office had determined to charge Cady Roberts and its 
involved partners with a 10b-5 violation for insider trading before Cary came to the 
Commission, so that although credit for the articulation (and justification) of this novel use 
of 10b-5 goes to Cary, it was the staff that initially formulated the argument.  Id. at 339. 
6 See Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).  This difficulty in Cady Roberts was 
stressed early on in William Painter, Insider Information: Growing Pains for the 
Development of Federal Corporation Law under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 
1381 (1965). 
7  Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). For my commentary on the limited 
success of Santa Fe in moving fiduciary duty off the center of the federal stage, see Donald 
C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial 
Accountability, 79 Wash. U.L.Q. 449 (2001). 
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good economic policy arguments to prohibit it anyway (though these are 
still highly contested8), but preventing open-market deception is not the 
fundamental point of any of them.   
 So how or why did the insider trading prohibition survive the 
retrenchment that happened to so many other elements of Rule 10b-5?  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chiarella v. United States9 in 1980 cut back on 
the law’s scope, but still sustained the useful fiction of insider trading as 
actionable deception. The core of insider trading regulation was left 
standing. We might call this a fictional “Cary-Powell compromise,” because 
Justice Powell was the moving intellectual force on the Court in 
reconceptualizing insider trading10 and cited Cady Roberts repeatedly and 
with apparent favor in both Chiarella and its follow-on, Dirks v. SEC,11 
even as he was otherwise doing so much pruning.  Powell’s two opinions 
joined with Cary in promoting the fiduciary’s duty of affirmative disclosure 
as the crucial explanation for how insider trading can be thought to be 
deceptive, without mention of the lingering irony of depending so much on 
purely constructive fraud.12  The later-developing misappropriation theory, 
a significant modification to the compromise that the Court finally ratified 
in 1997, long after Justice Powell had retired,13 was even more 
                                                          
8  I leave to elsewhere the never-ending debate among both lawyers and economists about 
whether and why insider trading is good or bad for the stock markets, stimulated initially 
by the work of Henry Manne.  For a recent collection of citations to this literature, see 
Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From Here?, 
14 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 43 (2010); see also LANGEVOORT, supra, §§1:2-1:6. 
9   445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
10 On Powell’s thinking here, drawn from his private papers and other sources, see Adam 
C. Pritchard, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 843, 931-34 (2003). The fiduciary emphasis reflected 
Powell’s deep-seated respect for fiduciary obligation, coupled with the idea that using this, 
rather than some more expansive line of demarcation, would dissuade the SEC and 
prosecutors from pursuing a parity of information campaign. 
11  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
12 See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982). 
13   United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  On Justice Powell’s apparent rejection 
of the misappropriation theory, see Adam C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency 
Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13 
(1998); Pritchard, supra.  Although the Supreme Court did not endorse the theory until 
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accommodating in accepting fiduciary faithlessness as deception, pushing 
the law back more in Cary’s direction.  As I argued in an earlier essay on 
Cady Roberts, this strange and intellectually ungainly judicial commitment 
to assertive insider trading regulation, even by some fairly conservative 
judges, shows how powerful a totemic symbol the prohibition of insider 
trading has become in “branding” the American securities markets as 
supposedly open and fair, and American securities regulation as the 
investors’ champion.14 Insider trading regulation had already taken on an 
expressive value far beyond its economic importance, which judges were 
reluctant to undercut.15  
 This commitment is hardly unconditional, however.  From the 
beginning, Wall Street has tried to label the SEC’s campaign against insider 
trading as an unrealistic and ill-conceived effort to achieve “parity of 
information” in securities markets, taking away the incentive to information 
discovery crucial to market efficiency. That was always a bit of 
hyperbole—from Cady Roberts on, the effort was always to define a 
category describing the illegitimate use of confidential information separate 
and distinct from proper uses.  But legitimacy is in the eyes of the beholder, 
and it is possible to think that it is never fair to take advantage of secrets 
that belong to others without their clear-cut permission.  If that drives the 
enforcement philosophy, we edge closer to parity of information, even if we 
never reach it.16 Chiarella chose the fiduciary principle as a line of 
                                                                                                                                                   
1997, the Second Circuit had embraced it almost immediately after Chiarella; outside the 
Second Circuit the theory was received unevenly, with adherence in some other circuits but 
rejection elsewhere.  See LANGEVOORT, supra, §6:2. 
14   Donald C. Langevoort, Re-reading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1999). 
15  The courts’ tolerance was no doubt also bolstered by the fact that, earlier case law 
notwithstanding, novel insider trading cases are almost always posed in SEC enforcement 
actions or criminal prosecutions, not in the private securities class actions in which so 
many judges seem to have lost faith.  See LANGEVOORT, supra, at §9:1.  It is difficult to 
predict how insider trading law would have fared had the first case to come up to the 
Supreme Court been one of whether and how much other investors could recover in class 
action suits claiming open market insider trading. 
16  See Arthur Fleischer et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market 
Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798 (1973).  The classic quest to define the illegitimate use 
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demarcation here based on the idea that it was naturally wrongful for 
fiduciaries (or their confederates) to secretly enrich themselves.   
 My argument is that the Supreme Court embraced the continuing 
existence of the “abstain or disclose” rule, and tolerated constructive fraud 
notwithstanding its new-found commitment to federalism, because it 
accepted the central premise on which the expressive function of insider 
trading regulation is based: manifestations of greed and lack of self-restraint 
among the privileged, especially fiduciaries or those closely related to 
fiduciaries, threaten to undermine the official identity of the public markets 
as open and fair.  The law thus grants an entitlement to public traders that 
marketplace pool will not be polluted by those kinds of insiders.  But 
enough time may have passed that we may have lost sight of the 
compromise associated with this fiction and started acting as if insider 
trading really is the worst kind of deceit. The result is pressure on doctrine 
to expand, using anything plausible in the 10b-5 toolkit.   
 Others have noted this expansionism, too; Donna Nagy has 
described it as the gradual “demise” of fiduciary principles in the law of 
insider trading.17  My aim here is to tie the concern more clearly to the 
uneasy deceptiveness of insider trading, first using somewhat familiar 
examples such as the debate over whether possession or use is required for 
liability (Part I) and the supposed overreach of Rule 10b5-2 (Part II).  Each 
of these settings brings us back to the centrality of intent, reminding us that 
the Cary-Powell compromise has in mind a form of intentionality that is 
closely tied to greed and opportunism, making insider trading a sui generis 
form of securities fraud.18  That takes us to the most jarring recent 
development in insider trading law, the emergence of recklessness as an 
alternative basis for liability (Part III).  I finish with consideration of insider 
trading without a fiduciary breach (Part IV), and a brief conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                                   
of inside information was Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational 
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322 (1979). 
17  Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 
Iowa L. Rev. 1315 (2009). 
18  See also Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 Duke L.J. 511, 561-63 (2011). 
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I.  SCIENTER AND INSIDER TRADING 
 
 We know from historical research that when Congress gave the SEC 
rulemaking authority in Section 10(b) in 1934, it did not intend to spawn the 
expansive and doctrinally intricate antifraud prohibition that later 
emerged.19 The Commission accomplished the first round of invention in 
1942 by transforming Section 17(a) of the Securities Act into Rule 10b-5, a 
prohibition fit for fraudulent purchases and sales, which the courts then 
busily fashioned over the next few decades into a deep body of law to 
promote truth-telling in the securities markets, for the protection of those 
injured by falsity. 
 Nothing in the apparent intent of Congress or the generalized desire 
to pursue “truth in securities” limits the scope of Section 10(b) to deliberate 
falsity. Negligent misrepresentation was an established tort in the common 
law, and Section 17(a) has long been read to given the SEC the ability to 
reach careless deception.20  So for a while—in the decade when Cary wrote 
Cady Roberts—the law under Rule 10b-5 was trending in the same 
direction based on this and other bold moves: a duty of candor owed by all 
persons, including secondary actors, that could potentially give rise to 
liability to everyone in the investment marketplace, whether trading or 
not.21 It was a largely unconfined federal securities tort law, heavily 
enforced through an implied cause of action that Congress almost certainly 
did not anticipate,22 much less authorize.  The judicial retrenchment of the 
1970’s was a reaction to this, with issues viewed through a more 
conservative lens that found judicial creativity in pursuing corrective justice 
or other policy aims increasingly distasteful.  The Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
19  See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1990). 
20  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
21  See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). 
22  See Thel, supra. 
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Hochfelder decision, one of the first in this series, limited Rule 10b-5 to 
intentional fraud.23  It did so by finding intentionality implicit in Congress 
stress on words like “device” or “contrivance” in its grant of rulemaking 
authority.  That was not a necessary or inevitable inference however, and 
probably wrong in terms of actual legislative intent.24  But it did restrain 
Rule 10b-5, and everything we know about the Court’s decision suggests 
that the justices were looking to refashion the Rule’s reach in response to 
strong claims of excess, especially in private litigation.   
 So what does scienter mean in Rule 10b-5 litigation?  It 
encompasses falsity where the maker knows that what he is saying is 
materially untrue and has the propensity to mislead.  Those are the easy 
cases.  There are two harder sets of issues, however.  By far the more 
familiar one is whether recklessness also satisfies the scienter requirement.  
Although the Supreme Court, from Hochfelder on, has explicitly avoided 
deciding the question, lower courts say yes.  But they diverge quite 
noticeably when it comes to explaining precisely what recklessness is.25  
Some speak in terms of an extreme departure from ordinary care 
(negligence plus).26  Others—probably the current majority approach—take 
this same starting point and then add an extra element of subjective 
awareness, a danger of misleading so obvious that the speaker must have 
been aware of it.27  This tries to capture the situation akin to conscious 
avoidance or indifference: the speaker knows that he does not know the 
truth, but speaks as if he did.  That he was not sure that he was lying is no 
defense.  As we shall see when we turn specifically to insider trading, there 
can be significant differences in coverage depending on which articulation 
                                                          
23  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
24  See Thel, supra. 
25  See Buell, supra. 
26  See SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998). 
27  See Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)(discussing case law and holding that 
subjective recklessness is required, though acknowledging that it can be established 
through circumstantial objective evidence). See generally Ann Morales Olazabal, Defining 
Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of Open Market Securities Fraud, 2010 
Wisc. L. Rev. 1415 (2010); for a state law survey of the same problem, see Geoffrey Rapp, 
The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 111 (2008). 
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is chosen. This is not insignificant, because human psychology tends to 
buffer the awareness of wrongdoing, especially in stressful situations.28 
 A less noticed but far from trivial issue involves the distinction 
between motive and intent.  Is it relevant whether the speaker desired to 
mislead investors, or had the purpose of misleading them, so that falsity that 
is simply collateral damage from a false communication uttered for some 
other reason is not actionable?  The conventional answer is no—awareness 
of the falsity and its propensity to mislead is enough.29  What, if anything, 
the defendant was trying to gain from the falsity is unimportant.  Indeed, it 
is hard to justify allowing recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement if 
the prohibition is limited to desired deception.  But one can find 10b-5 cases 
that suggest otherwise.30 
 So is all this a useful template for addressing scienter in the law of 
insider trading?  To the extent that the act of insider trading is not 
misleading to investors, formulations that stress awareness of the likelihood 
or risk of misleading investors are plainly inapposite.  Yet this is precisely 
the road taken by many courts.  The most challenging problems here relate 
to tipping (where, as was the case in Cady Roberts, the insider passes on the 
information directly or indirectly to another person who trades), and we will 
address this in some depth in Part III.  Outside of tipping, the context in 
which this arises involves the distinction between “possession” and “use” of 
inside information.31  Does the plaintiff in an insider trading case (e.g., the 
                                                          
28   See Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking?: State of Mind and Insider 
Trading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING (S. Bainbridge, ed., forthcoming 
2013).  For a judge’s thoughts on the motivations for an insider trading defendant for 
whom he did not want to impose an overly severe sentence, see United States v. Gupta, 
2012 WL 5246919 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)(Rakoff, J.)(“So why did Mr. Gupta do it?”). 
29  See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000); JAMES D. COX 
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASE AND MATERIALS 672-73 (6th ed. 2009). 
30  Somewhat famously, see United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp.2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Joan Heminway, Should Martha Stewart’s 10b-5 Charge Have Gone to the Jury?, in 
MARTHA STEWART’S LEGAL TROUBLES (J. Heminway, ed., 2007), at 203, 211. 
31  See LANGEVOORT, supra, at §3:13.  This has been an issue wherever an insider trading 
prohibition exists.  See Hui Huang, The Insider Trading Possession versus Use Debate: An 
International Analysis, 34 Sec. Reg. L.J. 130 (2006); Katja Langenbucher, The “Use or 
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SEC or a criminal prosecutor) have to prove that the insider was motivated 
to trade by the secret, so as to establish causation?  What if the defendant 
argues that the trade would have occurred regardless of whether he 
possessed the secret or not?  The possession approach simplifies 
prosecution, and is thus favored by the SEC.  In fact, the SEC defined 
insider trading in terms of simple awareness (not causation) in an 
interpretive rule adopted in 2000, Rule 10b5-1.  This approach connects 
well to the general understanding of scienter under 10b-5 that we have just 
described, which stresses subjective awareness but not motivation, as well 
as how we commonly think about fiduciary responsibility.32   
 A number of courts, however, have balked at this in insider trading 
cases.  Prior to the adoption of 10b5-1, some courts in both civil and 
criminal cases held that the test was based on use, although possession 
might create a rebuttable presumption of use.33  Defendants were free to 
break the causal link if they could persuade the fact-finder.  So one could 
argue that there was other information that led the trader to buy or sell, so 
that the inside information added nothing to the total mix.  Or the need to 
sell because of financial exigencies would have led to the sale whether or 
not the trader had come into possession of the information.  In fact, this line 
of case law developed strongly enough that some courts have ignored the 
adoption of Rule 10b5-1 and continue even today to make causation an 
element of the cause of action, or at least the subject of an affirmative 
defense.34   
                                                                                                                                                   
Possession” Debate Revisited—Spector Photo Group and Insider Trading in Europe, 5 
Cap. Mkt. L.J. 452 (2010). 
32  See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).   
33  The best known of these are SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) and United 
States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Second Circuit, on the other hand, had 
previously staked out a possession standard in United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d 
Cir. 1993), and consistently has adhered to that position.  See United States v. Royer, 549 
F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008). 
34 E.g., United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
555 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2009)(en banc); SEC v. Talbot, 430 F.Supp.2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 
2006), rev’d on other grounds, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).  For other citations, see 
LANGEVOORT, supra, §3:14 n. 2.  One court has even characterized the rule as if it had 
codified Adler, which is simply not so.  SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002).  Once 
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 As a practical matter, this may not be of immense significance; the 
SEC and criminal prosecutors tend to win their cases even when courts 
impose the higher burden of proof or permit rebuttal.35  But it is 
conceptually challenging, and taps into the theme I stated at the outset of 
this essay.  While possession (or awareness) is more plaintiff-friendly and 
fits most literally with 10b-5 jurisprudence generally, “use” ties much more 
closely with our intuitive understanding of what insider trading is, and why 
it is wrongful enough to look away from its questionable deceptiveness.  It 
is about violating an expectation of faithfulness, exploiting privileged 
access, taking advantage of others.  Those are active verbs connoting 
deliberation beyond mere awareness, and bad faith.36  Connecting back to 
the expressive function of insider trading regulation, it reflects the belief 
that insider trading is a manifestation of greed on the part of the privileged, 
rather than the self-restraint we want from insiders—i.e., the Cary-Powell 
compromise. 
 My argument is that to the courts that have demanded a showing of 
misuse and balked at Rule 10b5-1, there is an intuition that insider trading 
law is indeed sui generis.  It isn’t really fraud, even though we’ve chosen to 
call it that in order to preserve and embellish the useful message of investor 
protection.  If so, then the meaning of insider trading shouldn’t be fleshed 
out by reference to 10b-5 interpretive principles generally.  What’s more, 
the SEC should not have the unilateral authority to redefine what insider 
trading means in a way that breaks the Cary-Powell compromise or its 1997 
amendment.37  The Court allowed Cary’s constructive fraud to survive via 
                                                                                                                                                   
again courts in the Second Circuit differ, willingly embracing 10b5-1.  See United States v. 
Royer, supra. 
35  See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, supra; SEC v. Talbot, supra. 
36  Donna Nagy makes a similar point by reference to the policies underlying the insider 
trading prohibition, but concludes that in doing so the “use” courts are ignoring the basic 
fiduciary duty principles on which the Chiarella/Dirks formulation rests.  Nagy, supra, at 
1350-52.   My point is that the fiduciary duty formulation was never meant to import all of 
fiduciary duty law into the insider trading framework, but instead represents a way of 
brightening the line between legitimate and illegitimate uses of inside information.  If so, 
the “use” courts are actually being more faithful to the bargain. 
37  This has led to claims that the SEC has exceeded its authority in adopting the rule.  See 
Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 
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the fiduciary principle, and the nature of the bargain is that the judiciary 
retains control over the scope of the law so as not to allow that scope to 
expand beyond the reasons for its acceptance.  To me, this helps explain 
why in the two earliest foundational Supreme Court cases of contemporary 
insider trading law, Chiarella and Dirks, the Court gave no Chevron-style 
deference to the SEC’s interpretation of insider trading law under its own 
rule or its statutory grant of rulemaking authority,38 and why Rule 10b5-1’s 
definition has had such surprisingly little bite.   
 
II.  THE MEANING OF MISAPPROPRIATION 
 
 The misappropriation theory of liability for insider trading rests on 
the idea of secretive fiduciary disloyalty.  The insider deceives the source of 
the information, who has entrusted it to the insider with the expectation that 
he would act as a loyal fiduciary and not take personal advantage of it, by 
“feigning” loyalty while acting selfishly.  In contrast to the classical 
approach articulated in Chiarella and Dirks, the misappropriation test has at 
least a plausible theory of deception given its fact-to-face nature: 
presumably those who entrust information in a fiduciary setting to another 
actually do expect fidelity and are feel that they have relied to their 
detriment when the trust turns out to have been misplaced.39  But this is still 
                                                                                                                                                   
Bus. Law. 913 (2007); see also Carol Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and 
the Death of Scienter, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 147 (2003). 
38  This was remarked on recently by the Court in Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First 
Derivative Traders, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 (2011).  Formally, the reason for not 
following the SEC’s interpretation in Chiarella and Dirks was that the Commission did not 
have the ability to exceed its statutory mandate, which is limited to that which is 
fraudulent.  That is of course right, but question begging if we acknowledge that fraud has 
multiple possible meanings.  As I have written elsewhere, Janus is different but analogous: 
claiming judicial primacy over the scope of the implied private right of action under Rule 
10b-5.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative 
Securities Jurisprudence, Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013). 
39  The misappropriation theory derives from mail and wire fraud law, which initially—
under the guise of an “honest services” expectation—turned various forms of fiduciary-like 
misbehavior into federal crimes.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some 
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purely relational (and thus constructive) fraud,40 and on its face hard to 
square with the relegation of corporate fiduciary issues to state law that was 
explicit in the retrenchment decisions of the 1970s, particularly Santa Fe.41  
As a great number of commentators have pointed out, the misappropriation 
theory operates as a property-rights (or corporate secrets) protection regime, 
which is hardly what the securities laws are about.42  Its embrace by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan43 notwithstanding this is best 
explained the same way as Chiarella and Dirks—it offers a convenient 
conclusion to foster the belief that fiduciary cheating undermines market 
integrity, over which the federal securities laws have expressive dominion.  
This was enough for the majority to tolerate a major move back in Cary’s 
direction, albeit somewhat constrained by the earlier bargain.44  This time, 
however, there was serious pushback to this from the most conservative 
members of the Court, for whom the federalism line was particularly 
sacred.45 
 This is another slice of contested territory where some lower courts 
(and the SEC) have moved the law beyond its strict insistence on evidence 
of feigned loyalty and thereby drained some of the moral fervor out of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line 
Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981).  For a case connecting 
misappropriation (and 10b-5 generally) with the mail and wire fraud precedent, see United 
States v. Whitman, 2012 WL 5505080 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The honest services idea in mail 
and wire fraud has had a volatile history since that time, and now has a narrower scope in 
order to avoid excessive vagueness.  See United States v. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010).  
40   See Victor Brudney, O’Hagan’s Problems, 1997 S. Ct. Rev. 249 (1998). 
41 Two courts of appeals, the Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, rejected the 
misappropriation theory on strong federalism grounds.  See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 
933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996). 
42  E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice 
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1589 (1999).  This is 
underscored by the fact that there cannot be a misappropriation of legitimately acquired 
information so long as the trader discloses his intent to trade. 
43  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
44  See, e.g., Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O’Hagan Resolves Insider Trading’s Most 
Vexing Problems, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1998); Elliot Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan, 
Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. Corp. L. 395 (1998). 
45  Justices Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist) and Scalia each dissented. 
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insider trading prohibition. Others have explored this area as well,46 so I 
will be relatively brief here.  Sometimes, the source’s expectation as to 
confidentiality is made explicit, as in a code of conduct or insider trading 
policy statement.  Or it could be implicit, as in an unwritten norm 
understood by those who have been around long enough.  Indeed, it should 
generally be presumed as a matter of law even without an explicit 
prohibition, since all corporate agents are said to have a duty to act loyally 
and carefully with respect to their employer’s secrets.    
 I am less interested in how this general expectation is derived than 
in interpreting its content.  Even expressed expectations can vary in how 
strictly they are to be taken, in terms of exceptions, excuses and the like, 
and with respect to internal consequences if ignored.  The recent case of 
SEC v. Obus,47 which we will explore in detail in the next section, is 
instructive.  The insider’s employer, GE Capital, may have had a policy 
against sharing client information, but that would not answer the more 
subtle question of whether an exception would be tolerated if the person 
thought it might be helpful to the client or the firm to take a risk as to 
confidentiality. The same things could be said about brokerage firm 
policies, which are often at issue.48  But we cannot be overly troubled here, 
because courts do make this a crucial factual question at trial, and permit 
both sides to have their say about the policy as perceived on the ground, not 
just in the books.49 Assuming the fact-finder gets it right (which may be a 
                                                          
46 See Nagy, supra; see also Thomas Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider 
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 Hastings L.J. 881 (2010); Robert A. 
Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 J. Corp. L. 343 (2011). 
47  693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). 
48  See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012)(criminal proceeding for 
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, though not 10b-5 directly). This was also at the heart 
of the insider trading case against Martha Stewart.  See SEC v. Stewart et al., Litig. Rel. 
18169, June 4, 2003 (complaint); SEC v. Stewart, Litig. Rel. 19794, Aug. 7, 2006 
(settlement); on some of the issues here, see Ray Grzebleiski, Why Martha Stewart Did Not 
Violate Rule 10b-5: On Tipping, Piggybacking, Front-running and the Fiduciary Duties of 
Securities Brokers, 40 Akron L. Rev. (2007); Langevoort, What Were They Thinking?, 
supra. 
49  In Mahaffy, supra, the court goes at great lengths to consider whether brokerage firm 
employees faced an explicit or implicit prohibition on passing on “squawk box” 
information relating to forthcoming client trades that might be front-run by the recipient, 
14 
 
heroic assumption to be sure), liability is reserved for cheaters.  The same 
goes for expectations of loyalty among family and friends, a particularly 
fertile setting for insider trading enforcement.  The seepage in the law here, 
then, is not so much that we have let go of the fiduciary nexus so much as 
that we have learned how easy it is as a matter of law to locate that nexus in 
places outside of conventional principal-agent settings.   
 The most contested issue here grows out of the SEC’s fairly 
expansive effort to codify crucial aspects of the misappropriation theory in 
Rule 10b5-2, especially subsection (a).  This subsection creates an 
expectation of abstention from insider trading or tipping from a promise to 
respect confidentiality.  One problem here is that, taken literally, a promise 
to respect confidentiality says only that the promisor will keep the secret.  
An insider who transmits an anonymous purchase or sell order of limited 
size for execution on a stock market does not usually pose a threat to 
confidentiality, though there are certainly circumstances where the trade 
would be large or unusual enough that it could.50  More important is the 
disconnect from the “feigned loyalty” that is at the heart of the 
misappropriation theory.  The person who promises to keep a secret may 
not in any other way be a fiduciary, so that the argument of deception is 
essentially that a breach of promise is intrinsically fraudulent—which 
                                                                                                                                                   
day traders at another firm.  One could reasonably argue that whatever the brokerage firm’s 
expressed policy, the duty of loyalty to the client not to undercut its effort to get best 
execution should be clear as a matter of law.  But because the government prosecuted the 
case simply as one of disloyalty of the employees to their employers, establishing the 
employers’ expectation was presumably essential.  For a case where the customer 
disclaimed an expectation of non-use, see SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp.2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
50  Unless others in the market can infer that this was an insider’s trade, it is highly unlikely 
that there will be any market price reaction resulting from its execution.  For an evaluation, 
see Lauren Cohen et al., Decoding Inside Information, 67 J. Fin. 1009 (2012). That said, 
there will be times when trading does threaten confidentiality, which some see as part of a 
“property rights” justification for the misappropriation theory. E.g., Kenneth E. Scott, 
Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 801 
(1980); see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991)(Winter, J., 
concurring).  One need not assume a threat to believe that the employer (or principal) has a 
right to exclusive use of the information, of course. 
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certainly is not true at common law.  Some courts have questioned the 
validity of Rule 10b5-2(a) on these grounds.51 
 My sense is that it is all contextual, and that in many circumstances 
an implied promise of loyalty (i.e., non-use for personal gain) can 
reasonably be inferred from an explicit promise of confidentiality.52  But 
not always.  Consider this hypothetical, which bears some resemblance to 
(but differs in key respects from) the SEC’s on-going case against sports 
and media entrepreneur Mark Cuban.53  X holds a significant stake in a 
company, with which he has grown increasingly concerned because of 
financial missteps.  His relationship with company management is starting 
to fray, and he has thought about selling the block.  X receives a phone call 
from the CEO asking if he will keep some information confidential, and he 
says he will.  The CEO then tells him about a dilutive financing plan, which 
will probably cause the stock price to drop.  X is angry, very much wants to 
sell, and—without telling the company—does.  He suspects that the only 
reason the CEO called was to try to prevent any sale of the block, which 
might disrupt the planned transaction by driving down the market price if it 
occurred prior to consummation.   
 X promised confidentiality.  But in any meaningful sense did he 
“feign loyalty”?  He was increasingly adversarial to the company’s 
management to begin with, and noticeably angry after the fact.  Hence, 
                                                          
51  See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp.2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 620 
F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010)(finding that there were grounds on which to infer a promise not to 
trade, not just keep the information confidential).  In the Cuban litigation, a number of 
distinguished law professors (Allen Ferrell of Harvard, Steve Bainbridge of UCLA, Todd 
Henderson of Chicago, Jon Macey of Yale and Alan Bromberg of Southern Methodist) 
filed an amicus brief concluding that the rule is invalid on these grounds.  We should 
distinguish here situations involving promissory fraud, which arise when a person enters 
into an agreement intending not to perform.  See The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l 
Holdings, 532 U.S. 588 (2001)(promissory fraud is within the scope of Rule 10b-5, even if 
breaching a contract is not). 
52  Certainly trade usage is important here—does the business community in settings like 
the one at issue normally understand confidentiality to imply non-use as well.  And again, 
the issue would be different if the promise were designed to gain access to the information, 
where the promisor intended to breach. 
53  See note [51] supra.  Cuban denies making such a promise. 
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loyalty could not be much of a reasonable expectation on the CEO’s part, 
exceedingly hard to infer simply from a simple promise of secrecy.  That 
would be all the more so if X was right in his suspicion as to the CEO’s 
motives—trickery can hardly lead to a reasonable expectation of fidelity.   
 
III.  RECKLESS TIPPING 
 
 A.  Tippers 
 
 Ever since Cady Roberts, insider trading litigation has wrestled with 
the “tipping” problem: many people who trade on inside information are not 
themselves insiders, but received the information from (and are thus 
enabled by) someone who is.  Cady Roberts involved what may have been 
an innocent situation, because the insider—a director—shared the 
information with his brokerage firm colleague apparently believing that it 
had been released publicly, though it actually had not. Most tips are more 
venal, of course, where there is no doubt that the insider desires that the 
recipient be enriched by the trading opportunity, passing on the information 
precisely for that reason. 
 Cary finessed this issue by focusing on the recipient’s awareness 
that the information was still non-public and the fact that both “tipper” and 
recipient worked for the same brokerage firm, which was the principal 
respondent in the administrative proceeding.  Over the first two decades of 
insider trading law, the law continued to followed this pattern; the stress 
was less on formal status than access to an unfair informational advantage, 
and few could doubt that someone with a friend or colleague on the inside 
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willing to share secrets was as privileged—and in a position to exploit the 
information unfairly—as the insider himself.54   
 The retrenchment in Chiarella upset this, however, by making 
fiduciary status the key to finding the necessary deception, because of the 
presumed affirmative duty of disclosure fiduciaries have when transaction 
with their beneficiaries.  That refocused attention on the insider.  If being a 
fiduciary is essential to insider trading liability, what of tippees?  The 
Supreme Court anticipated this in a footnote, suggesting that there might be 
something in the law of civil conspiracy that could cause the tippee to take 
on the insider’s fiduciary duties and restrictions.55  A few years later, the 
Court addressed this squarely in the Dirks case.56  The opinion is generally 
read to say that the insider (tipper) is liable if but only if he breaches a 
fiduciary duty for personal benefit by passing on the information.  This 
personal benefit can come in a variety of forms: pecuniary, reputational, or 
simply making a gift of the information to a family member or friend.  The 
recipient (direct or indirect tippee) is liable as a co-venturer if he knew or 
had reason to know of the breach. 
 The Dirks test seems to speak to the state of mind of both tipper and 
tippee, and thus be about scienter.  But the Court never says that, and notice 
the incongruity with post-Hochfelder jurisprudence. The insider’s purpose 
and motivation appears crucial, whereas in the normal 10b-5 case the 
standard is knowledge or recklessness, neither of which makes purpose or 
motivation important.  To me, the Court was staking out a unique state of 
mind standard here, an illustration of the sui generis nature of insider 
trading law stressed earlier.  Indeed, as many courts and commentators have 
observed, the Court’s use of “know or should know” in crafting a tippee 
liability standard seems to fly directly in the face of Hochfelder. That 
                                                          
54  See LANGEVOORT, supra, §4:2. 
55  445 U.S. at 230 n. 12. 
56  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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caused some to conclude that the Court had made a careless mistake in 
exposition, and really meant to say knowledge or recklessness.57     
 We will come back to tippee liability shortly.  I have long assumed 
(and continue to believe) that Dirks is describing the essence of a tip as a 
communication deliberately intended to benefit both tipper and tippee by 
enabling the latter’s trading.  It is thus a form of conscious fiduciary 
disloyalty.58  This is underscored when the Court says that this rule is 
designed to prevent insiders from doing indirectly (gaining a personal 
benefit through someone else’s trading) what they cannot do directly under 
Chiarella (benefit by trading for their own account).  If that is so, then by 
all accounts there is no such thing as an innocent, or even negligent, tip.  
The insider in Cady Roberts would not have been breaching a fiduciary 
duty to the issuer by passing on to colleagues what had already been made 
public.  Carelessly talking too loudly with colleagues on a train, or 
mindlessly leaving a briefcase open for others to see would not be a 
violation even if it facilitates trading.  The element of deliberate disloyalty 
is simply not there. 
 But can there be a reckless tip?  Recently, in SEC v. Obus,59 the 
Second Circuit said yes.  There, an analyst for GE Capital, Strickland, was 
helping develop the financing of a possible acquisition of a company called 
SunSource.  Strickland called a friend who worked at a hedge fund that held 
a large equity stake in SunSource.  What was said in that conversation was 
in controversy, but according to the SEC, included the fact that the client 
was planning the acquisition.  The hedge fund later acquired more 
SunSource stock.   
                                                          
57  See, e.g., SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see LANGEVOORT, supra, 
§4:9; Buell, supra. 
58  See LANGEVOORT, supra, §4:6 & n.2; see also DONNA NAGY & RICHARD PAINTER, 
SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS AND THE CASE FOR AN FGD (FAIRER 
GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE) REGIME (unpublished manuscript, Sept. 2012) at 22-24.  A 
particularly clear endorsement of this is SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), 
citing language from Dirks itself. 
59  693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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 On the surface, the SEC’s argument is conventional.  If Strickland’s 
motivation for contacting his friend was to do the friend a favor, then that 
would satisfy Dirks as applied under the misappropriation theory so long as 
GE Capital had an expectation that the information would not be so used.  
Reversing a grant of summary judgment by the trial court, the Second 
Circuit found these issues to involve triable factual questions, which is not 
all that surprising a result.60   
 The defendants’ argument was that the phone call was meant to 
serve the client’s interest, which would preclude a finding of 
misappropriation.  One can see various ways in which this would be true: 
Strickland might have been trying to get helpful information about 
SunSource from the hedge fund manager, and/or trying to use his 
connection to curry favor with a large shareholder that could be used to 
smooth along the acquisition.  That, however, simply makes clear the 
factual nature of the inquiry, and would not necessarily make the case 
especially interesting as a matter of law.  It would show that Dirks’ avowed 
effort to use the insider’s motivation as a bright-line way of separating 
wrongful from legitimate trading is an illusion, but by now that point is 
fairly well understood. Human motivations are endlessly complex and 
indeterminate.61 
 Instead, what makes Obus interesting is the court’s suggestion that 
even if Strickland was not deliberately tipping his friend for personal gain, 
both could still be liable if Strickland acted recklessly in communicating the 
                                                          
60  See note [47] supra.  We should note here a lingering question about whether the 
misappropriation theory even has room for tipper-tippee liability given how it was 
articulated in O’Hagan, where in addressing how the “in connection with” requirement was 
satisfied noted that the misappropriation and trading “coincide.” That is not so in tipping 
cases, however, when there may be some time between the tip and the trade.  See Donna 
Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-
O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223 (1998).  Subsequent courts have uniformly 
rejected a strict co-incidence standard, finding a foreseeable causal relationship sufficient.  
See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).  It should be noted, 
however, that the two dissenting justices (Thomas and Scalia) on the O’Hagan court, who 
pushed hard on this issue, remain and would no doubt be skeptical of any approach that 
attenuates the “in connection with” requirement. 
61  See Langevoort, What Were They Thinking?, supra. 
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information in violation of GE Capital’s expectations.62  Here we see a 
court treating insider trading as part of a larger fabric of Rule 10b-5, 
invoking the scienter standard of an extreme departure from ordinary care 
without even the subjective awareness add-on that most other courts 
demand.63   
 But how does this square with Dirks’ insistence that the insider’s 
motivation in tipping be to seek a personal benefit?  The case law 
background here is circuitous.  For some time the SEC had been contending 
that the Dirks personal benefit test simply does not apply in 
misappropriation cases—only cases brought under the classical theory—and 
a few district courts had agreed.64  Moreover, the Second Circuit had in two 
high-visibility cases, United States v. Libera65 and United States v. 
Falcone,66 indicated that a misappropriation might be found where it was 
not even clear that the insider meant the conveyance of secret information 
as a tip to facilitate stock trading, as opposed to some other way of 
benefiting from the information.  All this was suggesting that there was 
ample room for misappropriation to develop as a separate and distinct 
concept of “stolen property” fraud, not just a different way of looking at to 
whom the fiduciary duty is owed.  The Obus court does not follow along 
                                                          
62  This is more expansive than the language in another recent case would suggest, where in 
dicta the Second Circuit said in prosecuting a tipper, the government must prove that “the 
tipper conveyed material nonpublic information to his ‘tippee’ with the understanding that 
it would be used for securities trading purposes.”  United States v. Gansman, 657 F.2d 85, 
92 (2d Cir. 2011).  In Obus, the court gives a “hypothetical” example of a person on a train 
who knowingly holds a sensitive telephone conversation in the presence of a friend who is 
a day trader, so that it is highly likely the friend will be tempted to trade based on what he 
hears.  693 F.3d at 287.  For examples of such cases at the district court level, see SEC v. 
Berrettini, 2012 WL 55579993 (N.D. Ill. 2012); SEC v. Keung, 2010 WL 3026618 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgt. LLC, 2009 WL 4277244 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009)(insider cannot “turn a blind eye” to the likelihood of trading).   
63  See notes [26-27] supra. 
64  See SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.2d 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); for dicta in support of this, 
see SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).  On the other hand, this view was squarely 
rejected in SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).  See David Cohen, Old Rule, New 
Theory: Revisiting the Personal Benefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the 
Misappropriation Theory, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 547 (2006). 
65  989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). 
66  257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).   
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these lines, however, and in fact says that the Dirks test does apply in 
misappropriation cases. 
 We should be careful here in parsing out the court’s dicta, which the 
first lower court to read it found “Delphic.”67  One possible reading harks 
back to one of the misappropriation cases just mentioned, United States v. 
Falcone.  There a warehouse employee leaked advance copies of Business 
Week in return for a substantial payoff.  The defendant’s argument on the 
insider trading count was that the leak was not necessarily for securities 
trading—he did not know why the recipient wanted an early look at the 
magazine.  The Second Circuit dismissed this argument, in language that 
suggests (though it does not use the word) recklessness.  Given the court’s 
inference that someone in defendant’s position would have realized at least 
a strong likelihood that insider trading was the recipient’s plan, this would 
seem to fit the definition.68 
 In Falcone, there was no doubt that the “insider’s” breach of 
fiduciary duty was both clear and self-serving.  Thus, the ruling does not 
press all that hard on the Cary-Powell compromise.  Obus, on the other 
hand, seems to invite the SEC to make a more aggressive kind of claim.  In 
fact, it says explicitly that Dirks’ personal benefit requirement is not part of 
a scienter inquiry.69  What the court seems to do here is disconnect benefit 
from intention, rendering intention superfluous.  If Strickland acted in a way 
that was an extreme departure for ordinary care—but short of deliberately—
liability could nonetheless follow for both tipper and tippee so long as there 
                                                          
67   See United States v. Whitman, 2012 WL 5505080 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
68 As a matter of law, Falcone was mainly addressing the “in connection with” requirement 
under Rule 10b-5 in light of O’Hagan’s holding that that test is satisfied when the 
misappropriation “coincides” with a purchase or sale.  Falcone gives a liberal reading to 
this, saying that the Court’s use of coincidence was not meant to eliminate tipping liability 
under the misappropriation theory, which is what would happen if the only 
misappropriation that could be actionable would be the act of trading itself.  See Nagy, 
Reframing, supra. 
69  693 F.3d at 286.  The court says that tipper scienter focuses on three things: the fact of 
the tip, the material nonpublic nature of the information, and the breach of a duty of 
confidentiality.  The court then says that each of these may be met via a showing of 
recklessness. 
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was in fact a benefit to the tipper.70  The court justified this by pointing to 
language in Dirks that suggests that the personal benefit standard is meant 
as an “objective” test, rather than being about subjective motivation. Hence 
a tip could conceivably occur without any actual awareness on the part of 
the insider that he was acting wrongfully (feigning fidelity) vis-à-vis the 
source of the information. 
 Dirks’ reference to an objective standard is admittedly confusing,71 
but I have always read it simply as explanation for why the personal benefit 
standard helps the tippee know where he stands (i.e., a tippee should be able 
to tell whether the information is being conveyed selfishly), and therefore 
should not chill legitimate investment research or trading.  The question 
remains one of the insider’s motivation, however.  In that sense, I find 
Obus’ styling of the law of reckless tipping at least potentially unsettling. In 
a casebook on securities regulation that I co-author, there has long been a 
hypothetical problem in which a new associate at a law firm goes home for 
Thanksgiving and over dinner tells her parents about some projects on 
which she is working, including a yet unannounced merger.72  Her father 
buys stock in the acquiree company shortly thereafter.  Part of the problem 
is meant to ask whether the father is liable as a misappropriator (probably 
yes under the intra-family presumption in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3)), but then the 
question arises as to the young associate herself.  Is she a tipper?  I have 
always thought the right answer is no, so long as the judge or jury does not 
find that she meant to enrich her father with the information by tipping him.  
                                                          
70  The language in Obus is somewhat ambiguous as to precisely what work recklessness is 
supposed to be doing in the case against Strickland.  See 693 F.3d at 291 (“And it is 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that Strickland intentionally or recklessly revealed material 
non-public information to Black, knowing that he was making a gift of information that 
Black was likely to use for securities trading purposes”).  That could be read to merge 
knowledge of the benefit with recklessness.  But given the court’s analysis earlier in the 
opinion, especially in disconnecting benefit from scienter, this would not necessarily 
follow. 
71  Adam Pritchard suggests based on historical research that the personal benefit standard 
was added to the Dirks opinion at the behest of Justice O’Connor, who thought that breach 
of duty by itself was too broad for the courtroom—thus the introduction of a more 
objective standard based on benefit.  Pritchard, supra. 
72  See COX ET AL., supra, at 906 (problem 14-4). 
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After Obus, however, the answer might be different if the fact-finder 
considers what she did reckless (which it may or may not be, to be sure).  If 
that is right, Obus shifts the law—and so changes the risks—having to do 
with discussing secrets in a variety of business and non-business settings.73 
 That Obus may be shifting the law in this way is not necessarily a 
criticism, of course.  Corporate secrets are important, and recklessness is 
bad, so sanctioning Strickland as a tipper may seem amply justifiable.  Plus 
it provides a safety valve should a disingenuous defense of mindlessness 
sway the jury.  So long as the sanctions that would come from finding him a 
non-deliberate tipper are proportionate to this lesser level of culpability, and 
civil insider trading sanctions are certainly flexible in this regard, there is 
something to be said for this expansionist approach to liability.  The 
analogy to the possession versus use issue here is noteworthy. The 
argument for possession alone (or simple awareness) is that it makes 
prosecution and enforcement easier and matches up more cleanly with our 
general understanding of scienter.  So, too, with reckless tipping, and it is 
thus not surprising that the Second Circuit was earliest and most clearly on 
board with the possession test, well before Rule 10b5-1,74 and that Obus 
cites that authority with approval. 
 The concern is the same as well.  A use standard demands that the 
conduct stay close to the core concern that animated the law of insider 
trading in the first place and justifies the abandonment of any serious 
investor deception requirement.  If the SEC or a prosecutor cannot persuade 
a judge or jury that there was true venality of the sort we associate with 
greedy opportunism by the privileged in core insider trading cases, 
marketplace integrity is not dangerously threatened.  Remember, no 
                                                          
73   Some indication that the Commission might not be pushing this idea too aggressively 
can be found in a proceeding where a young associate at a law firm talked too openly about 
a project she was working on with a close friend, who was an investment analyst at a 
financial services firm.  The Commission proceeded against the remote tippees, but not (so 
far) the young lawyer.  See SEC v. Conradt et al., Litigation Release No. 22581, 2012 WL 
6705847 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 26, 2012); Brian Baxter, Associate’s Failure to Keep Secrets a 
Cautionary Tale for Young Lawyers, Am. Law Daily, Nov. 30, 2012. 
74  See note [33] supra. 
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contemporaneous traders were harmed by relying on what Strickland or his 
tippees did.75  As to the source (GE Capital), that takes us to another 
important part of the case.  In holding that whether GE Capital’s reasonable 
expectations were frustrated is a disputed question of fact to be resolved at 
trial, the court had to address the fact that GE Capital did investigate and 
chose not to sanction Strickland, suggesting that it did not feel particularly 
deceived by his behavior.  The court dismisses this as an argument to be 
reserved for trial, and notes that GE Capital’s own interests and the public 
interest in market integrity are different.  True, but then we come back to 
our conception of how insider trading and market integrity relate, and 
whether this conduct bears enough family resemblance to the core.  If 
greediness is an essential feature of marketplace abuse, we may have 
crossed a line here. 
 
 B.  Tippee Scienter 
 
 The “knows or should know” standard in Dirks has always been 
hard to explain, especially if one want to try to fit it within a theory of 
strong moral culpability.  The effort by some courts to use recklessness here 
instead was revisionism in that direction.76  At the very least, my impression 
has been that such a broad standard could only have been intended by the 
Court on the assumption that liability arises only when the tipper conveys 
the information as a tip, so that the recipient understands that the 
information is to enable profitable trading.  So long as that is clear to the 
tippee, then a reason to know formulation as to breach is not unfair. 
 Obus goes on to address (maybe alter) the law relating to tippee 
scienter, too.  The court says that Dirks’ “knows or should know” language 
                                                          
75  The hedge fund received an offer of a large block, and accepted it.  To be sure, had the 
hedge fund gone looking for a large number of shares of a relatively thinly traded stock 
with an aggressive bid, it might have pulled sellers into the market. 
76  See note [57] supra. 
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was no mistake, and that—taking in to account the tippee’s own knowledge 
and sophistication—it is enough to show that he had reason to suspect that 
the information was acquired through some impropriety by the insider.77  
That, of course, further disconnects the legal standard from one of strong 
moral culpability, and makes the suspiciousness of the information’s source 
sufficient to trigger the tippee’s duty to abstain from trading.  Given that the 
tippee need not have awareness of the facts relating to the breach and 
benefit, the message here is that recipients of valuable information should 
assume that it is tainted, and not trade unless they are fairly sure it is 
legitimately theirs to take advantage of.   
 To anyone entirely committed to aggressive insider trading 
enforcement, this is surely an appealing standard.  The only serious scienter 
element here is awareness that the information is both material and 
nonpublic.  Enforcers can go after any recipient who understood that what 
they received was valuable and would not be able to establish a reasonable 
belief that they were entitled to the informational advantage.  I am assuming 
here that tippees still cannot be held liable unless their tipper is liable under 
that separate Dirks standard, so that enforcers will have to show breach and 
personal benefit on the tipper’s part in order to get the tippee.  Dirks seems 
to say this fairly clearly, though there is at least one strange court of appeals 
decision from a few years ago, United States v. Evans,78 that can be read to 
hold otherwise.  But with the expanded scope for tipper liability that Obus 
signals, this is somewhat cold comfort.79   
                                                          
77  693 F.3d at 288.   
78  486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007).  This case dealt with whether a tippee could be convicted 
after his tipper was acquitted on the same charges, and in saying yes, the court seems to 
suggest that the first part of the Dirks test is not essential to tippee liability.  For criticism, 
see LANGEVOORT, supra, §4:12 & n.8 (stretching the logic of Dirks “beyond its breaking 
point”); Nagy, supra, at 1346-47. 
79   Obus was not a criminal case, and there is good authority, at least in the Second Circuit, 
for believing that the standard of proof for criminal insider trading would be higher as to a 
tippee.  See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Whitman, supra (discussing post-Obus criminal standard for tipper-tippee liability). So we 
should not assume that its teachings necessarily lead to a greater risk of criminal 
prosecution.   
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 Scienter as to non-publicness, in particular, can be important.80  
Take the SEC’s settled case from a few years ago against Martha Stewart,81 
on which, in hindsight, Obus is quite instructive.  Stewart was aware that a 
biopharmaceutical company in which she was heavily invested was 
awaiting important news about its key product from the FDA.  She received 
a phone call from her stockbroker, who (she knew) was also the broker for 
the company’s principal insiders, essentially saying that the stock’s price 
was dropping and the insiders were selling.  It turns out that the FDA had in 
fact delivered bad news, which the company had not yet disclosed, though 
this fact itself was not communicated to her.  So styled, the case would 
require the SEC to show that the broker misappropriated information from 
the insiders and/or the brokerage firm in passing on what he did to Stewart 
(i.e., he was the tipper).  And she (the tippee) would have to know of its 
material, nonpublic nature, and have reason to know that the disclosure to 
her was wrongful.  Most discussion of the case has focused on the 
wrongfulness issue, and Obus suggests that the awareness standard would 
not be an exacting one as to that.  But if the knowledge of materiality and 
non-publicness is more strict, that might actually have been her best 
defense: especially after a phone call that began with the fact that the stock 
price was already dropping, her quick impression might well be that word 
of the FDA’s decision had gotten out to the market, so that the information 
about the insiders’ selling might not have been so sensitive.  We could call 
that a careless inference, maybe even extreme, but it is quite possible that 
her mind never really focused on the precise content of the information. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80  On the connection between recklessness and materiality, see Allan Horwich, An Inquiry 
into the Perception of Materiality as an Element of Scienter Under Rule 10b-5, 67 Bus. 
Law. 1 (2011); see also Langevoort, supra §5:6.   
81  See note [48] supra. 
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IV.  DECEPTION WITHOUT A FIDUCIARY BREACH 
 
 For some time, we have known of one big conceptual gap in the law 
of insider trading under the contemporary doctrinal framework: Rule 10b-5 
does not reach the trading based on the simple theft of information.82  
Various forms of industrial espionage can target sensitive corporate secrets, 
and use the fruits to trade.  Of course theft is independently criminal and 
tortious, so that our legal system hardly tolerates this kind of abuse.  It is 
simply that we fail to include it within the insider trading regime. 
 This is because theft is typically neither a breach of fiduciary duty 
nor fraudulent.  It can be, of course—a fiduciary can steal—and to some 
extent the misappropriation theory is simply based on the constructive fraud 
of the fiduciary’s conversion of the source’s information.  But building 
insider trading theory around the fiduciary principle meant that non-
fiduciary conversion or misappropriation was left out.  This is what led 
Chief Justice Burger to dissent in Chiarella.  He thought the duty to abstain 
or disclose should extend to situations where the trader had misappropriated 
the information even in the absence of any fiduciary duty owed to either 
marketplace counterparties or the information’s source.83   
 There are, however, situations where the theft of information by a 
non-fiduciary could involve some element of deception.  What of this?  
That issue arose in SEC v. Dorozhko,84 a hacking case.  Defendants were 
foreign traders who hacked into a server that facilitated the public 
                                                          
82   See LANGEVOORT, supra, §6:13; but see Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 Md. L. 
Rev. 570 (2007). 
83  The Court in Chiarella did not address Burger’s approach because it was not properly 
charged to the jury, and so for a time it had some potential.  However, the version of the 
misappropriation theory that the Second Circuit embraced was instead the one we have 
come to understand as the “fraud on the source” theory, endorsed in O’Hagan.  Many have 
argued that the law of insider trading would have been better off had the Burger theory 
been followed.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: 
Chiarella’s Past, Central Bank’s Future, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 865 (1995); Nagy, Demise, 
supra. 
84  574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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disclosure of corporate news, and so at any given time contained not-yet-
released material information.  These hackers could hardly be deemed 
fiduciaries, owing no duty to other marketplace traders and feigning no 
loyalty to anyone.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held they could be said 
to violate Rule 10b-5 by reverting to the plain text of Rule 10b-5 rather than 
either the classical or misappropriation theories.  To the extent (which 
would be determined on remand) that hacking involves tricking the host 
system into treating access as authorized, there could well be deception.  
And any such deception designed explicitly for gaining a trading advantage 
would be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.   
 While this seems to be an example of what I have criticized 
earlier—the use of 10b-5 tools that fail to recognize that the deception in 
insider trading is largely fictional—it is not.  If one accepts the court’s 
characterization of hacking, we have real deception here, and do not need to 
resort to constructive fraud.  Rather this poses the opposite question: is there 
any reason to consider the two fiduciary-based theories exclusive statements 
of insider trading’s scope?  The Second Circuit could think of no good 
reason to, and neither can I.85  The classical and misappropriation theories 
are simply two inventive compromise solutions to the deception puzzle, 
embraced because they do what courts have thought to be important work in 
sustaining the expressive campaign against insider trading.  To me, this 
limited third way targets conduct that is as disturbing as any fiduciary 
breach.  We are by no means bleeding the insider trading prohibition of its 
moralism here. 
 The remaining awkwardness is that this still leaves plain theft 
uncovered, but that does not seem to be a good justification for not reaching 
                                                          
85 The argument that finding hacking to be the basis for insider trading ignores the 
fiduciary breach requirement of Chiarella and O’Hagan is precisely the reason given by 
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits for why the misappropriation theory was invalid (see note 
[41] supra): it ignored Chiarella’s insistence that we look for a fiduciary duty owed to 
other marketplace traders.  But O’Hagan held that nothing in Chiarella was meant to say 
that it was setting the exclusive test for insider trading liability.  So, too, with Dorozhko’s 
theory of deception.  For further analysis, see Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The 
Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common Defenses and Best Practices for 
Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 151, 158-61 (2011).   
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what we can within textualist limits.  We can think up many interesting 
hypotheticals to tease this out.  If one knew that a New York City bicycle 
courier was carrying papers about a secret transaction, simply knocking him 
down while he was rounding a corner and running away with the bag would 
not violate Rule 10b-5.  But luring him into a dark alley by falsely 
suggesting a short cut might.  Or consider the difference between breaking 
into an executive’s house and finding the office and lying to get access to a 
part of the house (“I need to find a bathroom”) that would allow undetected 
access to the office as well.86  These are “fine distinctions,” to be sure, but 
the inevitable result of how we have constructed the law of insider trading. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 With Cady Roberts, Cary set in motion a conversation about insider 
trading as fraud among those who make this law: the courts and the SEC.  I 
have suggested that we think in terms of a compromise that occurred when 
Justice Powell and the Supreme Court first tried to take control of the 
doctrine, accepting insider trading as deception but confining the scope of 
liability for this kind of constructive fraud to those who commit or 
participate in a fiduciary-like breach.  It is instructive to imagine an actual 
conversation about this between Cary and Powell, their total disagreement 
on federalism and judicial (and administrative) restraint bridged by their 
shared disdain for fiduciary misbehavior common to insider trading. In this 
imaginary negotiation, I suspect Cary got more than he gave up, especially 
in light of the later endorsement of the misappropriation theory. 
 There is another conversation that has gone on, however, largely 
between the SEC and criminal prosecutors and the New York-based judges 
in the Second Circuit.  That insider trading is fraudulent and harmful is 
taken for granted, thereby justifying an approach that looks aggressively for 
                                                          
86  See SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006)(wife “tricks” husband into revealing 
inside information).   
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ways of penalizing those who know or suspect that they have a trading 
advantage derived from information that does not belong them. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur was the starting point for this conversation, and the contemporary 
cases like Obus and Dorozhko show that it remains a fruitful one. 
 By and large, I think that the Second Circuit judges have done well 
in preserving and extending Cary’s original ideas as against the competing 
impulses of federalism and restraint.  Generally, I favor aggressive insider 
trading regulation because insider trading should be seen as market abuse,87 
whether or not it is meaningfully described as deception.  As Cary said, 
neither fine distinctions nor rigid classifications should constrain such an 
expressive form of law.  But the market abuse caused by insider trading is 
mainly reputational, and so—especially in a time when the penalties against 
insider trading can be so harsh compared to other kinds of securities 
fraud—maybe we should be reserving the category for conduct that is 
plainly greedy and abusive.  This is the aspect of the Cary-Powell bargain 
that maybe we want to hold onto a bit more carefully. That one can make an 
argument that something is insider trading does not always mean that one 
should.   
  
 
                                                          
87  This is the phrase used in Europe, where insider trading prohibitions have been codified 
based on a policy of market protection, not limited to fraud.  See Guido Ferrarini, The 
European Market Abuse Directive, 41 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 711 (2004). 
